US Department of Justice - Part Of Bush, Cheney, Rumsfled Employment To Plan And Launch War On Iraq

So now we know, in those very, very familiar words - "We was just doing our jobs."

From here:

In court papers filed today (PDF), the United States Department of Justice requested that George W. Bush, Richard Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice and Paul Wolfowitz be granted procedural immunity in a case alleging that they planned and waged the Iraq War in violation of international law.

Plaintiff Sundus Shaker Saleh, an Iraqi single mother and refugee now living in Jordan, filed a complaint in March 2013 in San Francisco federal court alleging that the planning and waging of the war constituted a “crime of aggression” against Iraq, a legal theory that was used by the Nuremberg Tribunal to convict Nazi war criminals after World War II.

"The DOJ claims that in planning and waging the Iraq War, ex-President Bush and key members of his Administration were acting within the legitimate scope of their employment and are thus immune from suit,” chief counsel Inder Comar of Comar Law said.

The “Westfall Act certification,” submitted pursuant to the Westfall Act of 1988, permits the Attorney General, at his or her discretion, to substitute the United States as the defendant and essentially grant absolute immunity to government employees for actions taken within the scope of their employment.

In her lawsuit, Saleh alleges that:

-- Richard Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz began planning the Iraq War in 1998 through their involvement with the “Project for the New American Century,” a Washington DC non-profit that advocated for the military overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

-- Once they came to power, Saleh alleges that Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz convinced other Bush officials to invade Iraq by using 9/11 as an excuse to mislead and scare the American public into supporting a war.

-- Finally, she claims that the United States failed to obtain United Nations approval prior to the invasion, rendering the invasion illegal and an act of impermissible aggression.

“The good news is that while we were disappointed with the certification, we were prepared for it,” Comar stated. “We do not see how a Westfall Act certification is appropriate given that Ms. Saleh alleges that the conduct at issue began prior to these defendants even entering into office. I think the Nuremberg prosecutors, particularly American Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson, would be surprised to learn that planning a war of aggression at a private non-profit, misleading a fearful public, and foregoing proper legal authorization somehow constitute lawful employment duties for the American president and his or her cabinet.”

(source)

How Murdoch Sold The World The War On Iraq

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:

Article 20

1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.

Robin Beste: 

"Rupert Murdoch's newspapers and TV channels have supported all the US-UK wars over the past 30 years, from Margaret Thatcher and the Falklands war in 1982, through George Bush Senior and the first Gulf War in 1990-91, Bill Clinton's war in Yugoslavia in 1999 and his undeclared war on Iraq in 1998, George W. Bush's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, with Tony Blair on his coat tails, and up to the present, with Barack Obama continuing the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and now adding Libya to his tally of seven wars."

 "The week before the world's largest anti-war protests ever and the United Nation's rejection of the Iraq War in mid-February 2003, Murdoch told a reporter that in launching a war Bush was acting "morally" and "correctly" while Blair was "full of guts" and "extraordinarily courageous." Murdoch promoted the looming war as a path to cheap oil and a healthy economy. He said he had no doubt that Bush would be "reelected" if he "won" the war and the U.S. economy stayed healthy. That's not an idle statement from the owner of the television network responsible for baselessly prompting all of the other networks to call the 2000 election in Bush's favor during a tight race in Florida that Bush actually lost."


John Nichols:

"When the war in Iraq began, the three international leaders who were most ardently committed to the project were US President Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Australian Prime Minister John Howard. On paper, they seemed like three very different political players: Bush was a bumbling and inexperienced son of a former president who mixed unwarranted bravado with born-again moralizing to hold together an increasingly conservative Republican Party; Blair was the urbane 'modernizer' who had transformed a once proudly socialist party into the centrist 'New Labour' project; Howard was the veteran political fixer who came up through the ranks of a coalition that mingled traditional conservatives and swashbuckling corporatists.

"But they had one thing in common. They were all favorites of Rupert Murdoch and his sprawling media empire, which began in Australia, extended to the 'mother country' of Britain and finally conquered the United States. Murdoch's media outlets had helped all three secure electoral victories. And the Murdoch empire gave the Bush-Blair-Howard troika courage and coverage as preparations were made for the Iraq invasion.

"Murdoch-owned media outlets in the United States, Britain and Australia enthusiastically cheered on the rush to war and the news that it was a 'Mission Accomplished.'"

And so it was.

The Iraq War Is Over....For The Pentagon

The New York Times, the newspaper that helped start the War On Iraq, announces it has come to an end on its online front page :




There is no mention on the front page of the New York Times, at all, of the estimated half-million or more Iraqis who lost their lives during nine years of American Occupation.

That's got to please the Pentagon.

Considering the amount of coverage the Iraq War has been given here, on and off, over the years, I should have a lot to say about this historic day.

But I don't.

We saw what happened when a strand of the American war industry elite decided Iraq had to be destroyed, nothing could stop them, and nothing didn't. They got nine years of war and destruction and world-poverty lifting military budgets.

Do you think it will be any different next time?

Is it, when it comes to War On Iran?

Of course not.

They get the wars they want.

And it's always been this way.

"Take Em Out"

"Oh Dude!'

What happened in Fallujah in 2003-2005 remains one of the darkest secrets of BushCo.'s War On Iraq. Just one of dozens, if not hundreds, of acts of state terrorism unleashed on the civilians of that city :

Victorious Iraq Resistance Fighters To US : 'Get Out'

So here we are almost eight years after the illegal War On Iraq began and the Iraqi government wants to make sure the United States under Obama will stick to its deal :

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ruled out the presence of any U.S. troops in Iraq after the end of 2011, saying his new government and the country's security forces were capable of confronting any remaining threats to Iraq's security, sovereignty and unity.

A majority of Iraqis—and some Iraqi and U.S. officials—have assumed the U.S. troop presence would eventually be extended, especially after the long government limbo. But Mr. Maliki was eager to draw a line in his most definitive remarks on the subject. "The last American soldier will leave Iraq" as agreed, he said, speaking at his office in a leafy section of Baghdad's protected Green Zone.

And the man who helped deliver Maliki his new power to turf out US troops, if it is decided they will try and stay beyond 2011, is the very same man the Bush administration spent years trying to destroy :

"This agreement is not subject to extension, not subject to alteration. It is sealed." Mr. Maliki's new majority depends partly on followers of anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

And the Iraqi resistance fighters, known in the Western media as terrorists and insurgents, are
now a solid part of the Maliki government's power base :

"The militias are now part of the government and have entered the political process," said Mr. Maliki. The Sadr contingent, he added, "is moving in a satisfactory direction of taking part in the government, renouncing violence and abandoning military activity, and that's why we welcome it."

And :

(Maliki) said full withdrawal of U.S. troops also will remove a prime motivator of insurgents—both the Shiite fighters tied to militia groups and Iran, and Sunnis linked to Mr. Hussein's ousted Baath party.

The Full Story Is Here

Iraqis resisted, primarily, United States and British forces for seven years, and it's hard not see that their resistance, in the end, resulted in a victory, voices in the government, real government power, the kind of victory President Bush promised would never be allowed to happen.

In the end, Iraq's resistance fighters beat back and beat down the most powerful military in the world, ground them down in fact, until the United States were forced to pay them tens of millions of dollars not to kill American soldiers, until the United States stepped back and allowed them to have a say in the democratic future of their country.

That, of course, is the truth of the end of the War On Iraq.

The United States lost.

Iraqis won.

The resistance, as brutal, deadly, inhuman as it was, worked.

Deputy British PM : "The Iraq War Was Illegal"

By Darryl Mason

So here we are, seven years later, trillions of dollars gone, more than 5200 coalition soldiers dead, more than 300,000 wounded and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis killed or disabled.

From the UK Independent :

Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg today restated his view that the Iraq War was illegal, saying: "I don't think the legality of that invasion has been proven."

Apart from questions over the legality of the conflict, Mr Clegg said the wisdom of the 2003 invasion "certainly hasn't been proven at all".

"You can turn it on its head - I don't think the legality of that invasion has been proven. The wisdom of it certainly hasn't been proven at all."

What will they say about this age of senseless war on some of the world's poorest people 300 years from now?

"In the second year of the 21st century, the dying meganation of the United States launched an illegal war on Iraq, in a desperate attempt to stop the Iraqi dictator Sadddam Hussein selling oil in Euros instead of US dollars. The war claimed more than one million American lives, in the warzone, and back home. The War On Iraq, and the decades of rehabilitation for the millions of Americans who were recruited by war corporations, finally bankrupted the United States, economically and spiritually, leading to its break up."

In early 2003, 10 million people around the world, at tens of thousands of protests, chanted that the Iraq War was illegal, that there were no weapons of mass destruction, that the war was wrong and would bring death and suffering to the people of Iraq.

And they were right.

But our leaders, at least in most Western nations, pretended they knew nothing of what the protesters shouted, and they did as they always do, and started another war against the will of the people.

That's it. No country will ever fight another Trillion Dollar War.

The next time they will probably just for nukes instead.

It's so much cheaper.

And quicker.

For now, the three biggest chearleaders of the War On Iraq - US President Bush, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and Australian Prime Minister John Howard - walk free, write books and refuse to deny the war was illegal, they say instead, in perfect imitation of each other, "it was the right thing to do."

But the truth is, in the end, the Iraq insurgency won. They fought the world's most powerful war machine to a standstill, with machine guns and improvised bombs. The insurgency only stopped killing dozens of soldiers a month when they were paid cash to lay down their arms.

The greatest lesson of the Iraq War was learned decades ago, but the myth of Military Victory has kept the truth hidden, behind million dollar recruitment ads, and hundred million dollar movies promoting the military and war. Insurgencies are hard to defeat. All but impossible to defeat in a city of millions, like Baghdad, unless you are willing to sacrifice vast numbers of your own troops.

Or, by 2020, vast numbers of your expensive war robots.

Iraq Rebuilding : The $100 Billion ClusterFuck

What a scam. Sorry, what an enormously profitable scam :

An unpublished 513-page federal history of the American-led reconstruction of Iraq depicts an effort crippled before the invasion by Pentagon planners who were hostile to the idea of rebuilding a foreign country, and then molded into a $100 billion failure by bureaucratic turf wars, spiraling violence and ignorance of the basic elements of Iraqi society and infrastructure.

The history, the first official account of its kind, is circulating in draft form here and in Washington among a tight circle of technical reviewers, policy experts and senior officials. It also concludes that when the reconstruction began to lag — particularly in the critical area of rebuilding the Iraqi police and army — the Pentagon simply put out inflated measures of progress to cover up the failures.

In one passage, for example, former Secretary of State Colin L. Powell is quoted as saying that in the months after the 2003 invasion, the Defense Department “kept inventing numbers of Iraqi security forces — the number would jump 20,000 a week! ‘We now have 80,000, we now have 100,000, we now have 120,000.’ ”

Mr. Powell’s assertion that the Pentagon inflated the number of competent Iraqi security forces is backed up by Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, the former commander of ground troops in Iraq, and L. Paul Bremer III, the top civilian administrator until an Iraqi government took over in June 2004.

Among the overarching conclusions of the history is that five years after embarking on its largest foreign reconstruction project since the Marshall Plan in Europe after World War II, the United States government has in place neither the policies and technical capacity nor the organizational structure that would be needed to undertake such a program on anything approaching this scale.

The bitterest message of all for the reconstruction program may be the way the history ends. The hard figures on basic services and industrial production compiled for the report reveal that for all the money spent and promises made, the rebuilding effort never did much more than restore what was destroyed during the invasion and the convulsive looting that followed.

By mid-2008, the history says, $117 billion had been spent on the reconstruction of Iraq, including some $50 billion in United States taxpayer money.

The history contains a catalog of revelations that show the chaotic and often poisonous atmosphere prevailing in the reconstruction effort.

¶When the Office of Management and Budget balked at the American occupation authority’s abrupt request for about $20 billion in new reconstruction money in August 2003, a veteran Republican lobbyist working for the authority made a bluntly partisan appeal to Joshua B. Bolten, then the O.M.B. director and now the White House chief of staff. “To delay getting our funds would be a political disaster for the President,” wrote the lobbyist, Tom C. Korologos. “His election will hang for a large part on show of progress in Iraq and without the funding this year, progress will grind to a halt.” With administration backing, Congress allocated the money later that year.

¶In an illustration of the hasty and haphazard planning, a civilian official at the United States Agency for International Development was at one point given four hours to determine how many miles of Iraqi roads would need to be reopened and repaired. The official searched through the agency’s reference library, and his estimate went directly into a master plan. Whatever the quality of the agency’s plan, it eventually began running what amounted to a parallel reconstruction effort in the provinces that had little relation with the rest of the American effort.

¶Money for many of the local construction projects still under way is divided up by a spoils system controlled by neighborhood politicians and tribal chiefs. “Our district council chairman has become the Tony Soprano of Rasheed, in terms of controlling resources,” said an American Embassy official working in a dangerous Baghdad neighborhood. “ ‘You will use my contractor or the work will not get done.’ ”

A Cautionary Tale

The United States could soon have reason to consult this cautionary tale of deception, waste and poor planning, as troop levels and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan are likely to be stepped up under the new administration.

The incoming Obama administration’s rebuilding experts are expected to focus on smaller-scale projects and emphasize political and economic reform. Still, such programs do not address one of the history’s main contentions: that the reconstruction effort has failed because no single agency in the United States government has responsibility for the job.

Five years after the invasion of Iraq, the history concludes, “the government as a whole has never developed a legislatively sanctioned doctrine or framework for planning, preparing and executing contingency operations in which diplomacy, development and military action all figure.”

Titled “Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience,” the new history was compiled by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, led by Stuart W. Bowen Jr., a Republican lawyer who regularly travels to Iraq and has a staff of engineers and auditors based here. Copies of several drafts of the history were provided to reporters at The New York Times and ProPublica by two people outside the inspector general’s office who have read the draft, but are not authorized to comment publicly.

Mr. Bowen’s deputy, Ginger Cruz, declined to comment for publication on the substance of the history. But she said it would be presented on Feb. 2 at the first hearing of the Commission on Wartime Contracting, which was created this year as a result of legislation sponsored by Senators Jim Webb of Virginia and Claire McCaskill of Missouri, both Democrats.

The manuscript is based on approximately 500 new interviews, as well as more than 600 audits, inspections and investigations on which Mr. Bowen’s office has reported over the years. Laid out for the first time in a connected history, the material forms the basis for broad judgments on the rebuilding program.

In the preface, Mr. Bowen gives a searing critique of what he calls the “blinkered and disjointed prewar planning for Iraq’s reconstruction” and the botched expansion of the program from a modest initiative to improve Iraqi services to a multibillion-dollar enterprise.

Mr. Bowen also swipes at the endless revisions and reversals of the program, which at various times gyrated from a focus on giant construction projects led by large Western contractors to modest community-based initiatives carried out by local Iraqis. While Mr. Bowen concedes that deteriorating security had a hand in spoiling the program’s hopes, he suggests, as he has in the past, that the program did not need much outside help to do itself in.

Despite years of studying the program, Mr. Bowen writes that he still has not found a good answer to the question of why the program was even pursued as soaring violence made it untenable. “Others will have to provide that answer,” Mr. Bowen writes.

“But beyond the security issue stands another compelling and unavoidable answer: the U.S. government was not adequately prepared to carry out the reconstruction mission it took on in mid-2003,” he concludes.

The history cites some projects as successes. The review praises community outreach efforts by the Agency for International Development, the Treasury Department’s plan to stabilize the Iraqi dinar after the invasion and a joint effort by the Departments of State and Defense to create local rebuilding teams.

But the portrait that emerges over all is one of a program’s officials operating by the seat of their pants in the middle of a critical enterprise abroad, where the reconstruction was supposed to convince the Iraqi citizenry of American good will and support the new democracy with lights that turned on and taps that flowed with clean water. Mostly, it is a portrait of a program that seemed to grow exponentially as even those involved from the inception of the effort watched in surprise.

Early Miscalculations

On the eve of the invasion, as it began to dawn on a few officials that the price for rebuilding Iraq would be vastly greater than they had been told, the degree of miscalculation was illustrated in an encounter between Donald H. Rumsfeld, then the defense secretary, and Jay Garner, a retired lieutenant general who had hastily been named the chief of what would be a short-lived civilian authority called the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.

The history records how Mr. Garner presented Mr. Rumsfeld with several rebuilding plans, including one that would include projects across Iraq.

“What do you think that’ll cost?” Mr. Rumsfeld asked of the more expansive plan.

“I think it’s going to cost billions of dollars,” Mr. Garner said.

“My friend,” Mr. Rumsfeld replied, “if you think we’re going to spend a billion dollars of our money over there, you are sadly mistaken.”

In a way he never anticipated, Mr. Rumsfeld turned out to be correct: before that year was out, the United States had appropriated more than $20 billion for the reconstruction, which would indeed involve projects across the entire country.

Mr. Rumsfeld declined to comment on the history, but a spokesman, Keith Urbahn, said that quotes attributed to Mr. Rumsfeld in the document “appear to be accurate.” Mr. Powell also declined to comment.

The secondary effects of the invasion and its aftermath were among the most important factors that radically changed the outlook. Tables in the history show that measures of things like the national production of electricity and oil, public access to potable water, mobile and landline telephone service and the presence of Iraqi security forces all plummeted by at least 70 percent, and in some cases all the way to zero, in the weeks after the invasion.

Subsequent tables in the history give a fast-forward view of what happened as the avalanche of money tumbled into Iraq over the next five years.

Dashed Expectations

By the time a sovereign Iraqi government took over from the Americans in June 2004, none of those services — with a single exception, mobile phones — had returned to prewar levels.

And by the time of the security improvements in 2007 and 2008, electricity output had, at best, a precarious 10 percent lead on its levels under Saddam Hussein; oil production was still below prewar levels; and access to potable water had increased by about 30 percent, although with Iraq’s ruined piping system it was unclear how much reached people’s homes uncontaminated.

Whether the rebuilding effort could have succeeded in a less violent setting will never be known. In April 2004, thousands of the Iraqi security forces that had been oversold by the Pentagon were overrun, abruptly mutinied or simply abandoned their posts as the insurgency broke out, sending Iraq down a violent path from which it has never completely recovered.

At the end of his narrative, Mr. Bowen chooses a line from “Great Expectations” by Dickens as the epitaph of the American-led attempt to rebuild Iraq: “We spent as much money as we could, and got as little for it as people could make up their minds to give us.”

US-British Execution Squads Kill Thousands Of Iraqis

From Kurt Nimmo :

“More than 3,500 insurgents have been ‘taken off the streets of Baghdad’ by the elite British force in a series of audacious ‘Black Ops’ over the past two years,” reports Sean Rayment for the London Telegraph. “It is understood that while the majority of the terrorists were captured, several hundred, who were mainly members of the organization known as ‘al-Qa’eda in Iraq’ have been killed by the SAS.”

Recall the Washington Post, the CIA’s favorite newspaper, admitting that the putative leader of "al-Qaeda in Iraq," the criminal retard Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was little more than a Pentagon PSYOP.

The assassination program in Iraq is a collaborative effort between the British SAS and the American Delta Force. It is called “Task Force Black.”

General Petraeus was so impressed with the assassination effort he remarked: “They have exceptional initiative, exceptional skill, exceptional courage and, I think, exceptional savvy. I can’t say enough about how impressive they are in thinking on their feet.”

Let’s rewind. Recall the Washington Post, the CIA’s favorite newspaper, admitting that the putative leader of “al-Qaeda in Iraq,” the criminal retard Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was little more than a Pentagon PSYOP. “The U.S. military is conducting a propaganda campaign to magnify the role of the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, according to internal military documents and officers familiar with the program. The effort has raised his profile in a way that some military intelligence officials believe may have overstated his importance and helped the Bush administration tie the war to the organization responsible for the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks,” wrote Thomas E. Ricks in a front page story for the newspaper on April 10, 2006. “For the past two years, U.S. military leaders have been using Iraqi media and other outlets in Baghdad to publicize Zarqawi’s role in the insurgency. The documents explicitly list the ‘U.S. Home Audience’ as one of the targets of a broader propaganda campaign.”

As Michel Chossudovsky notes, much of this fairy tale propaganda is delivered to the corporate media by “top feeders” at the Pentagon. “Disinformation and war propaganda are an integral part of military planning. What the Washington Post fails to mention, however, is its own role in sustaining the Zarqawi legend, along with network TV, most of the printed press, and of course CNN and Fox News, not to mention a significant portion of the alternative media,” writes Chossudovsky. As we know, the Washington Post was long ago compromised by the CIA’s Operation Mockingbird, so this role is now reflexive. US military-intelligence has created it own terrorist organizations. In turn, it has developed a cohesive multibillion dollar counterterrorism program “to go after” these terrorist organizations. To reach its foreign policy objectives, the images of terrorism in the Iraqi war theater must remain vivid in the minds of the citizens, who are constantly reminded of the terrorist threat. The Iraqi resistance movement is described as terrorists led by Zarqawi. In other words, “al-Qaeda in Iraq” is a fabrication designed to discredit the Iraqi resistance.

Sean Rayment and the London Telegraph would have us believe the British SAS is only killing “al-Qaeda in Iraq” members. In fact, it appears they are targeting the leadership of the Iraqi resistance while capturing and imprisoning street level “terrorists,” that is to say fighters resisting occupation.

As for British involvement in creating terrorism in Iraq, recall the two SAS agents captured by the Iraqis attempting to stage terror attacks. “Iraqi security officials on [September 19, 2005] variously accused the two Britons they detained of shooting at Iraqi forces or trying to plant explosives,” the Washington Post reported.

As I wrote at the time, “the next time you read or hear about crazed ‘al-Qaeda in Iraq’ terrorists blowing up children or desperate job applicants, keep in mind, according to the Iraqi Interior Ministry, the perpetrators may very well be British SAS goons who cut their teeth killing Irish citizens.”

The CIA ran likewise operations in Vietnam. As former CIA employee Ralph McGehee notes, the “U.S. and Saigon intel services maintained an active list of VC cadre marked for assassination” in the late 1960s. Dubbed Operation Phoenix, the assassination program “called for ‘neutralizing’ 1800 [alleged Viet Cong] a month.” Approximately one third of the Viet Cong targeted for arrest were summarily killed by so-called “security committees” in provincial interrogation centers outside of judicial control and funded by the CIA. More than 40,000 Vietnamese were killed under Operation Phoenix at an estimated cost of nearly $2 billion (see Ralph McGehee, CIA and Operation Phoenix in Vietnam).

The collaborative effort between the British SAS and America’s Delta Force is obviously designed to take out the leadership of the Iraqi resistance, led by a disparate and not necessarily connected combination of former Ba’athists, nationalists, Sunni and Shi’a militias. It is intended to decimate the leadership — referred to as “al-Qaeda in Iraq” terrorists in the corporate media — as the United States prepares to downsize its presence in Iraq and shift emphasis under a new administration to Afghanistan.

BushCo. Demands Iraq Accept Bases And The Forever Occupation

How can there ever be peace in Iraq when the US occupation will never end, at least as far as BushCo., the NeoCons and no doubt plenty of Democrats, are concerned? They spent more than half a trillion invading, occupying and slaughtering the opposition, so they will stay until they see a return on the investment. Welcome to the free market, Iraq :

For five years the Bush administration has played wack-a-mole with the American people as to why we are in Iraq, with a new justification quickly spawning after the hollow core of the prior position was exposed. WMD's was followed by fighting Al Qaeda and ultimately bringing democracy to the Middle East. Last week the proverbial mole may have met his maker and exposed the true reason over a million Americans have been put in harm's way.

In May 2004, President Bush explained that our mission in Iraq was "to see the Iraqi people in charge of Iraq for the first time in generations." A week into his second term, Bush said he would "absolutely" honor any request for withdrawal of U.S. troops by a sovereign Iraqi government, only to then ignore multiple request over the next three years and polls showing near unanimous support among Iraqi's for a timeline for withdrawal.

All this was laid bare this month as the Iraqi government went on the offensive in its call for U.S. withdrawal by 2010. Far from embracing the desires of a sovereign Iraq, the White House instead feebly attempted to claim Prime Minister Maliki's statement was mistranslated, while the McCain camp argued that Iraqi's really want the U.S. to stay until 2020. Apparently their view of a "free Iraq" is an Iraq that is free to do what we tell them to do.

The Iraqi demand for a deadline for withdrawal of U.S. troops comes in the context of ongoing negotiations with the U.S. over a Status of Forces (SoF) Agreement in which the White House is seeking to define its legacy through (i) an indefinite occupation; (ii) more than 50 permanent bases (including five mega-bases); (iii) the unlimited ability to pursue the "war on terror" in Iraq (including ability to arrest Iraqis without consulting government); (iv) control of Iraqi airspace below 29,000 feet; (v) supervision of Iraq's defense, interior and national security ministries for ten years; and (vi) immunity for U.S. forces and contractors. In addition, the U.S. wants the right to unilaterally determine whether an act by another country (i.e., Iran) constitutes a "threat" to Iraq and respond as it deems fit in order to "protect" Iraq.

The Iraqi's have rejected this invitation to be an American colony as "arrogant" and an affront to their sovereignty, but the White House is playing hardball and recently cost the Iraqi's $5 billion by blocking the transfer of certain Iraqi currency reserves out of the declining dollar.

From the start of the occupation, the Bush administration has shown little regard for Iraqi sovereignty and international legal prohibitions against making significant changes to the legal and political institutions of an occupied country. Instead, the administration pursued what, former World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz characterized as "an even more radical form of shock therapy than pursued in the former Soviet world," as it completely reshaped Iraq's legal and economic regime to turn it into a Club Med for corporate interests.

The shock therapy was administered by Paul Bremer, who headed the Coalition Provisional Authority, through 100 separate Orders which suspended all tariffs and import fees (Order 12); immunized foreign contractors (Order 17); calls for the sale of 200 state owned enterprises through 40-year ownership licenses (Order 39); allowed foreign corporations to fully own Iraqi businesses and remove profits tax free (Order 39); cut corporate income taxes by two-thirds through a 15 percent flat tax (Order 49) and even restricts Iraqi farmers from using certain seeds without paying a license fee to seed suppliers such as Monsanto (Order 81).

The Bush administration also has ignored Congressional restrictions on the use of government funds "to exercise United States control over the oil infrastructure or oil resources of Iraq," as the State Department recently assisted the Big 5 oil companies in winning rights to develop some of Iraq's largest oilfields. Soon they will join Halliburton and others who have made billions off the war while protected by our troops.

The current spat over the SoF Agreement once again raises the question of why we fought this war to begin with. After five years of war at a cost of approximately $539 billion, 90,000 Iraqi lives, over 35,000 American soldiers wounded or killed, we now know what we suspected all along -- that Operation Iraqi Freedom was never about liberating the people of Iraq but instead about liberating its assets for foreign exploitation. Naomi Klein was right four years ago when she described the Bush mission as "pillaging Iraq in pursuit of a neocon utopia."

That is why with or without the SoF Agreement, Bush's legacy is secure. The hollow echo of Operation Iraqi Freedom reminds us that while other presidents may have failed the American people in one way or another, no president has failed, deceived or betrayed the American people like George W. Bush.

US Army Creating Its Own Air Attack Wings In Iraq And Afghanistan

Clashes Between US Army And Air Force

The US Army has decided that the US Air Force aren't pulling their weight, or bombing enough people from the sky. They've got a plan, apparently, already underway, that remarkably enough seems to be pitting the Army against the Air Force. Or so this New York Times story would lead to believe :

Ever since the Army lost its warplanes to a newly independent Air Force after World War II, soldiers have depended on the sister service for help from the sky, from bombing and strafing to transport and surveillance.

But the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have frayed the relationship, with Army officers making increasingly vocal complaints that the Air Force is not pulling its weight.

In Afghanistan, Army officers have complained about bombing missions gone awry that have killed innocent civilians. In Iraq, Army officers say the Air Force has often been out of touch, fulfilling only half of their requests for the sophisticated surveillance aircraft that ground commanders say are needed to find roadside bombs and track down insurgents.

The Air Force responds that it has only a limited number of those remotely piloted Predators and other advanced surveillance aircraft, so priorities for assigning them must be set by senior commanders at the headquarters in Baghdad working with counterparts at the Air Force’s regional command in Qatar. There are more than 14,000 airmen performing tasks on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, including Air Force civil engineers replacing Army construction engineers.

But now in Iraq, the Army has quietly decided to try going it alone for the important surveillance mission, organizing an all-Army surveillance unit that represents a new move by the service toward self-sufficiency, and away from joint operations.

Senior aides to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates say that he has shown keen interest in the Army initiative — much to the frustration of embattled Air Force leaders — as a potential way to improve battlefield surveillance.

The work of the new aviation battalion was initially kept secret, but Army officials involved in its planning say it has been exceptionally active, using remotely piloted surveillance aircraft to call in Apache helicopter strikes with missiles and heavy machine gun fire that have killed more than 3,000 adversaries in the last year and led to the capture of almost 150 insurgent leaders.

The Army aviation task force became fully operational last July with headquarters at Camp Speicher, in the north-central city of Tikrit, and focuses its efforts on insurgents planting roadside bombs. But it also has located and attacked insurgents in battles with American and Iraqi troops, and has supported missions of the top-secret Special Operations units assigned to capture or kill the most high-value targets in Iraq.

The battalion is called Task Force Odin — the name is that of the chief god of Norse mythology, but it also is an acronym for “observe, detect, identify and neutralize.” The task force of about 300 people and 25 aircraft is a Rube Goldberg collection of surveillance and communications and attack systems, a mash-up of manned and remotely piloted vehicles, commercial aircraft with high-tech infrared sensors strapped to the fuselage, along with attack helicopters and infantry.

The Army cobbled together small civilian aircraft, including the Beech C-12, and placed advanced reconnaissance sensors on board. Also assigned to the task force are small, medium and larger remotely piloted Army surveillance vehicles, including the Warrior and Shadow, with infrared cameras for night operations and full-motion video cameras.

All are linked by radio to Apache attack helicopters, with Hellfire missiles and 30-millimeter guns, and to infantry units in armored vehicles.

Civilian casualties are always a risk in air raids, particularly those attacking bomb-placing teams that operate in cities and villages. Army officials declined to say whether they believed the casualties from the new Army raids included innocent civilians, but they sought to pre-empt some criticism by screening an aerial surveillance video that they said showed the precise nature of the raids.

The video showed an insurgent who had escaped attack and hid in a courtyard a few feet from a grazing mule. It then showed Apache helicopter fire killing the insurgent, while the mule was left grazing beside the corpse.

In contrast to Predators, which are assigned by the top headquarters for missions all across Iraq, Task Force Odin is on call for commanders at the level of brigade and below, an effort by the Army to be responsive to the needs of smaller combat units in direct contact with adversaries — and a clear sign of rivaling concepts with the Air Force.

Task Force Odin was created on orders of Gen. Richard A. Cody, the Army’s outgoing vice chief of staff, as a way to improve the detection of roadside bombs before they explode, and to strike more adversaries more safely, from a distance. Thus far, not a single helicopter or piloted surveillance airplane has been lost in the unit’s missions.

“Task Force Odin provides a current example in Iraq that reveals how reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition improves survivability,” General Cody said in a statement.

Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary, said Mr. Gates “wants to make sure that we are looking at not just top-down solutions, but ground-up solutions. We need to pay attention to anything that works.”

Strains between the services have surfaced in the years since the military undertook the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Army and Marine Corps officers in Afghanistan have complained that Air Force pilots flying attack missions in support of ground operations do not come in as low as their Navy and Marine counterparts. Instances of civilian casualties from bombing and missile attacks have increased tensions among local populations, which have to be eased by ground commanders, adding to their burden of winning hearts and minds in the counterinsurgency efforts.

“We are supporting the Army as best we can,” Michael W. Wynne, the departing Air Force secretary, said Friday. He said that as the Army and Marine Corps increased ground forces in Iraq as part of the so-called troop surge over the past year, the Air Force quadrupled its number of sorties and increased its bombing tenfold. The number of surveillance flights by Predators and the larger Reaper vehicles over Iraq and Afghanistan has doubled since January of 2007.

Army officers who are promoting the new concept have shown senior Pentagon officials classified video clips intended to advertise the service’s increasing go-it-alone ability. One clip from a remotely piloted vehicle shows an insurgent using palm fronds to smooth dirt over a bomb he had buried late at night along a major convoy route. Moments later, he disappeared in 30-millimeter fire from an Apache that was alerted by the remotely piloted Army surveillance craft overhead.

The Army is asking for money to create a similar unit in Afghanistan within the next six months.

The Giants Of Oil Return To Iraq

Some forty years after being kicked out of Iraq by Saddam Hussein, four Western oil giants are plotting their return :

By the end of the month, Royal Dutch Shell, BP, Exxon Mobil and Total will sign agreements with the Baghdad government, Iraq's first with big Western oil firms since the US-led invasion in 2003.

The deals are for repair and technical support in some of the country's largest oilfields, the Oil Ministry in Baghdad said yesterday. The return of "Big Oil" will add to the suspicions of those in the Middle East who claimed that the overthrow of Saddam was secretly driven by the West's desire to gain control of Iraq's oil. It will also be greeted with dismay by many Iraqis who fear losing control of their vast oil reserves.

Iraq's reserves are believed to be second only to Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, but their exploitation has long been hampered by UN sanctions, imposed on Iraq after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990.

The major oil companies have been eager to go back to Iraq, but are concerned about their own security and the long-term stability of the country. The two-year no-bid agreements are service agreements that should add another 500,000 barrels of crude a day of output to Iraq's present production of 2.5 million barrels a day (b/d).

The companies have the option of being paid in cash or crude oil for the deals, each of which will reportedly be worth $500m (£250m). For Iraq, the agreements are a way of accessing foreign expertise immediately, before the Iraqi parliament passes a controversial new hydrocarbons law.

But they mean that the four oil companies, which originally formed the Iraq Petroleum Company to exploit Iraqi oil from the 1920s until the industry's nationalisation in 1972, will be well-placed to bid for contracts for the long-term development of these fields. The oilfields affected are some of the largest in Iraq, from Kirkuk in the north to Rumaila, on the border with Kuwait. Although there is oil in northern Iraq, most of the reserves are close to Basra, in the far south.

Since the US invasion, Iraqis have been wary of foreign involvement in their oil industry. Many are convinced that the hidden purpose of the US invasion was to take over Iraqi oil, but the Iraqi Oil Minister, Hussein Shahristani, has said that Iraq will hold on to its natural resources. "If Iraq needs help from international oil companies, they will be invited to co-operate with the Iraqi National Oil Company [Inoc], on terms and conditions acceptable to Iraq, to generate the highest revenue for Iraq".

For the four oil giants, the new agreements will bring them back to a country where they have a long history. BP, Exxon Mobil, Total and Shell were co-owners of a British, American and French consortium that kept Iraq's oil reserves in foreign control for more than 40 years.

The Iraq Petroleum Company (once the Turkish Petroleum Company) was formed in 1912 by oil companies eager to grab the resources in parts of the Ottoman Empire.

The company was formalised in 1928 and each of the four shareholders had a 23.75 per cent share of all the oil produced. The final 5 per cent went to Calouste Gulbenkian, an Armenian businessman.

In 1931, an agreement was signed with Iraq, giving the company complete control over the oi fields of Mosul in return for annual royalties. After Saddam's coup in 1958, nationalisation came in 1972.

More from the IHT :

The no-bid contracts are unusual for the industry, and the offers prevailed over others by more than 40 companies, including companies in Russia, China and India. The contracts, which would run for one to two years and are relatively small by industry standards, would nonetheless give the companies an advantage in bidding on future contracts in a country that many experts consider to be the best hope for a large-scale increase in oil production.

There was suspicion among many in the Arab world and among parts of the American public that the United States had gone to war in Iraq precisely to secure the oil wealth these contracts seek to extract. The Bush administration has said that the war was necessary to combat terrorism. It is not clear what role the United States played in awarding the contracts; there are still American advisers to Iraq's Oil Ministry.

Sensitive to the appearance that they were profiting from the war and already under pressure because of record high oil prices, senior officials of two of the companies, speaking only on the condition that they not be identified, said they were helping Iraq rebuild its decrepit oil industry.

For an industry being frozen out of new ventures in the world's dominant oil-producing countries, from Russia to Venezuela, Iraq offers a rare and prized opportunity.

While enriched by $140 per barrel oil, the oil majors are also struggling to replace their reserves as ever more of the world's oil patch becomes off limits. Governments in countries like Bolivia and Venezuela are nationalizing their oil industries or seeking a larger share of the record profits for their national budgets. Russia and Kazakhstan have forced the major companies to renegotiate contracts.

The Iraqi government's stated goal in inviting back the major companies is to increase oil production by half a million barrels per day by attracting modern technology and expertise to oil fields now desperately short of both. The revenue would be used for reconstruction, although the Iraqi government has had trouble spending the oil revenues it now has, in part because of bureaucratic inefficiency.

For the American government, increasing output in Iraq, as elsewhere, serves the foreign policy goal of increasing oil production globally to alleviate the exceptionally tight supply that is a cause of soaring prices.

The first oil contracts for the majors in Iraq are exceptional for the oil industry.

They include a provision that could allow the companies to reap large profits at today's prices: the ministry and companies are negotiating payment in oil rather than cash.

1 In 5 American 'War On Terror' Veterans Come Home With PTSD, Depression

Suicides May Outnumber War Zone Deaths

The survival rate for American soldiers shot, bombed and blown up, in Iraq and Afghanistan is the best of any American war. But the cloud of suicide hangs over hundreds of thousands of American veterans, and unlike WW1, WW2, Korea and Vietnam, governments in the future will not be able to pretend the 'suicidal-veteran' problem does not exist :

Suicides and "psychological mortality" among US soldiers who served in Iraq and Afghanistan could exceed battlefield deaths if their mental scars are left untreated, the head of the US Institute of Mental Health warned Monday.

Of the 1.6 million US soldiers who have been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, 18-20 percent -- or around 300,000 -- show symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression or both, said Thomas Insel, head of the National Institute of Mental Health.

Left untreated, PTSD and depression can lead to substance abuse, alcoholism or other life-threatening behaviors.

"It's a gathering storm for the civilian and public health care sectors," Insel said.

The true cost of the War On Iraq for the US is now starting to come into focus.

Many Americans, thanks to Pentagon controlled and customised reporting on the war by much of the mainstream media, have no real understanding of the horrors witnessed by young soldiers, or how much paying for the care of the mentally wounded will cost the treasury in decades to come.

It's Official, US Now Arming And Paying Iraqi Insurgents

US-Israel-Sunni Alliance Against Iran Rapidly Takes Shape

We will never negotiate with terrorists, President Bush once thundered. He forgot to add, "until they kill and wound so many of our troops we have no choice but to pay them to stop killing us."

From the Washington Post :

Inside a brightly lit room, the walls adorned with memorials to 23 dead American soldiers, Lt. Col. Robert Balcavage stared at the three Sunni tribal leaders he wanted to recruit.

Their fighters had battled U.S. troops. Balcavage suspected they might have attacked some of his own men. The trio accused another sheik of having links to the Sunni insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq. That sheik, four days earlier, had promised the U.S. military to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq and protect a strategic road.

"Who do you trust? Who do you not trust?" said Balcavage, commander of the 1st Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division, his voice dipping out of earshot.

An hour later, he signed up some of America's newest allies.

U.S. commanders are offering large sums to enlist, at breakneck pace, their former enemies, handing them broad security powers in a risky effort to tame this fractious area south of Baghdad in Babil province and, literally, buy time for national reconciliation.

American generals insist they are not creating militias. In contracts with the U.S. military, the sheiks are referred to as "security contractors." Each of their "guards" will receive 70 percent of an Iraqi policeman's salary. U.S. commanders call them "concerned citizens," evoking suburban neighborhood watch groups.

But interviews with ground commanders and tribal leaders offer a window into how the United States is financing a new constellation of mostly Sunni armed groups with murky allegiances and shady pasts.

The two-week-old initiative, inspired by similar efforts underway in Baghdad, Anbar and Diyala provinces, has more than halved attacks here against American troops, from 19 a day to seven, U.S. commanders said. But in a land of sectarian fault lines and shifting tribal loyalties, the strategy raises concerns about the long-term implications of empowering groups that steadfastly oppose the Shiite-led government.

Shiite leaders fear that the United States is financing highly trained and well-armed militias that could undermine the government after American troops withdraw. Shiites worry such groups could weaken central authority and challenge democratic institutions that many would like to see take root.

U.S. generals said they vet the backgrounds of every recruit, but ground commanders here said that is all but an impossible task.

"Officially, we will not deal with those who have American blood on their hands," said Balcavage, 42. "But how do you know? You don't. There's a degree of risk involved. A lot of it is gut instinct. That's what I'm going on. They didn't teach me how to do this at West Point."

In this fertile region, divided by the Euphrates River and torn by violence, U.S. soldiers are overstretched and Iraqi troops are in short supply. Isolated Sunni tribal lands have provided extremists with havens that are off-limits to U.S. patrols and Iraq's mostly Shiite security forces.

"We've done nothing in this area, because we could not get in there," said Col. Michael Garrett, commander of the 4th Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, adding that the tribal strategy will "buy time and access."

The sheiks are promised reconstruction projects in their strongholds and jobs for their fighters in Iraq's security forces. In return, they pledge to patrol their lands, battle al-Qaeda in Iraq and dismantle roadside bombs, the main killer of U.S. soldiers.

The sheiks commit to securing oil pipelines and U.S. military supply routes, taking over some of the duties of Iraq's army and police. The fighters are provided with badges, yellow reflective belts and arrest powers.

"It's like rent-a-cop," said Maj. Rick Williams, a Tulsa native who is a liaison to tribal leaders in the region.

The goal is to mimic the successes unfolding in the Sunni heartland of Anbar, where U.S-backed sheiks have fought al-Qaeda in Iraq for months. There, insurgent attacks have dropped dramatically.

But in this patch of north Babil province, colored in green hues and crisscrossed with irrigation canals, marshes and fish farms, the tribal and sectarian landscape is more complex than in Anbar, which is homogenously Sunni. Babil's battle lines blur easily.

Hundreds of local Sunni tribesmen have aligned themselves with al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Islamic Army or other Sunni insurgent groups. Shiite tribes are weak because loyalties to clerics are stronger than allegiances to sheiks.

Most of the new recruits hail from the Jenabi, the largest and most influential tribe. Under Saddam Hussein, the Jenabi were considered a "golden tribe," filling the ranks of his elite Republican Guard and army. After the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, the Jenabi, like so many other Sunni tribes, joined the insurgency.

Ahmed Rasheed Khadr, 38, was among them. He and his fighters fought U.S. forces with a vengeance, he said. But by 2005, Khadr was facing a new threat. Extremists linked to Al-Qaeda in Iraq overran Howija, where his family owned 700 acres, and imposed strict interpretations of Islamic laws. And like Afghanistan's Taliban, they banned smoking, television, even cellphones with video cameras, Khadr said.

The Jenabi splintered. Some sided with the al-Qaeda in Iraq fighters out of fear. Others joined because they wanted to isolate themselves from the region's Shiites and their militias. Those who refused to align were targeted, often by their own tribesmen.

"The Jenabi tribe, the problem they're having is that the al-Qaeda is them," Balcavage said.

The forming of alliances between US troops and Sunni insurgents grows more interesting when you add in the massive arms funding BushCo. is now planning to pour into Sunni dominated Middle East states, including Saudi Arabia, as part of creating a united and heavily armed front against Iran.

Australian defence contractors are salivating over the possibility of ramping up their sales of Bushmaster vehicles, catamarans and assorted weaponry, to the Middle East, as part of a 'payback' from the United States for the Howard government's commitment to spend more than $US28 billion on American war machines in the coming years.

The United States is now easing the pressure off the Sunnis in Iraq, by claiming that three quarters of all attacks against American troops last month were carried out by Shiites, primarily Shiite militias. While this may in fact be true, such a move also helps Dick Cheney's current plan to undermine and eventually depose the Maliki government because they have failed to get the new Oil Law passed.

Presumably, the Sunni factions and the Kurds, who can be expected to take control of the government should the Cheney plan come to fruition, have already agreed to pass the new laws which would see most of the control of Iraq's vast oil riches passed to foreign control, primarily American oil giants, with the Kurds given free rein to get the oil pipeline to the Haifa port, in Israel, under way.

The wider point in all this is that the US now seems to be firming up the Sunni alliance in Iraq, regardless of their American killing tendencies, as part of the wider Sunni-Israel-US alliance against Iran, which also forms a front to control Middle East oil against the Russians and Chinese, now firmly aligned with Iran through hundreds of billions of dollars in oil and natural gas deals.

Iraqi PM Says Americans Can Leave, Iraq Will Survive

TE Lawrence On 'Iraq' Insurgency 78 Years Ago - Not Much Has Changed



Iraq's prime minister Maliki has announced that American forces can leave his war-ravaged country any time they want, though he would prefer that they stay and keep training Iraqi police and military :

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said Saturday that the Iraqi army and police are capable of keeping security in the country...

The embattled prime minister sought to show confidence at a time when congressional pressure is growing for a withdrawal and the Bush administration reported little progress had been made on the most vital of a series of political benchmarks it wants al-Maliki to carry out.

Al-Maliki said difficulty in enacting the measures was "natural" given Iraq's turmoil.

Top aides to Maliki, and numerous members of the government are furious at the latest US assessment of progress in Iraq's government, widely given a failing grade by the CIA, the majority of the US Congress, and virtually every major news organisation.

Iraqis believe the US is treating their nation like "an experiment in an American laboratory."

One aide, Hassam al-Suneid, launched a savage critique of the US military, claiming :

it was committing human rights violations, embarassing the Iraqi government with its tactics and cooperating with "gangs of killers" in its campaign against al-Qaida in Iraq.

Al-Suneid's comments were a rare show of frustration toward the Americans from within al-Maliki's inner circle as the prime minister struggles to overcome deep divisions between Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish members of his coalition and enact the American-drawn list of benchmarks.

....al-Maliki told reporters Saturday, "We say in full confidence that we are able, God willing, to take the responsibility completely in running the security file if the international forces withdraw at any time they want."

But he added that Iraqi forces are "still in need of more weapons and rehabilitation" to be ready in the case of a withdrawal.

On Friday, the Pentagon conceded that the Iraqi army has become more reliant on the U.S. military. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Peter Pace, said the number of Iraqi batallions able to operate on their own without U.S. support has dropped in recent months from 10 to six, though he said the fall was in part due to attrition from stepped-up offensives.

Al-Maliki told a Baghdad press conference that his government needs "time and effort" to enact the political reforms that Washington seeks - "particularly since the political process is facing security, economic and services pressures, as well as regional and international interference."

Al-Suneid, a Shiite lawmaker close to al-Maliki, bristled at the pressure.

He criticized U.S. overtures to Sunni groups in Anbar and Diyala, encouraging former insurgents to join the fight against al-Qaida in Iraq. "These are gangs of killers," he said.

"There are disagreements that the strategy that Petraeus is following might succeed in confronting al-Qaida in the early period but it will leave Iraq an armed nation, an armed society and militias," said al-Suneid.

Journalist Robert Fisk wrote in the UK Independent quotes extensively from a 1929 entry on "Guerilla" for the Encyclopedia Britannica written by TE Lawrence. He said "it contains (a) ghastly message to the American armies in Iraq" :

Writing of the Arab resistance to Turkish occupation in the 1914-18 war, he asks of the insurgents (in Iraq and elsewhere): "... suppose they were an influence, a thing invulnerable, intangible, without front or back, drifting about like a gas? Armies were like plants, immobile as a whole, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. The Arabs might be a vapour..."

To control the land they occupied, he continued, the Turks "would have need of a fortified post every four square miles, and a post could not be less than 20 men. The Turks would need 600,000 men to meet the combined ill wills of all the local Arab people. They had 100,000 men available."

Now who does that remind you of? The "fortified post every four square miles" is the ghostly future echo of George W Bush's absurd "surge". The Americans need 600,000 men to meet the combined ill will of the Iraqi people, and they have only 150,000 available.

More from Lawrence on Arab/Muslim insurgencies in the land that would become Iraq :

"The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern (guerrilla) commander..."

Exchange 'printing press' for video and the internet and it's a close match to today.

"Rebellion must have an unassailable base ...In the minds of men converted to its creed. It must have a sophisticated alien enemy, in the form of a disciplined army of occupation too small to fulfil the doctrine of acreage: too few to adjust number to space, in order to dominate the whole area effectively from fortified posts.

"It must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent active in a striking force, and 98 per cent passively sympathetic ... Granted mobility, security ... time, and doctrine ... victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain."

Has President Bush read this definition of an Arab/Muslim insurgency by TE Lawrence, wonders Fisk. Did Rumsfeld? What about General Petraus?

The likely answer is no, no and maybe. And even if they did it, they have already shown, numerous times, that they've learned little from history, from all the wars in the Middle East that have swallowed up generations from the West.

Pentagon Kills Off Rumsfeld's Fake-Story Generating, News Controlling Iraq War Propaganda Unit - Or So They Say

The Iraqi Parliament And US Congress Are Both On Holidays Through August - But Iraqis And Americans Will Go On Dying

Pro-Bush, Pro-Iraq War Newspaper Now Joins Call For Troop Withdrawal

US Helicopter Opens Fire During Fighting With Shiite Militias - Witnesses Say Americans Killed Two Reuters Journalists

Thursday : 97 Iraqis Killed, More Than 90 Wounded

Friday : 100 Iraqis Killed, More Than 50 Wounded

US Report Paints Bleak Picture Of Political, Social Progress By Maliki Government

Will Desperate Republicans Force Cheney, Then Bush To Resign Over Iraq War Failure? Before 2008 Elections?

18 Month Old Baghdad Baby Warns Mother About Sniper Fire - Baghdad Babies Learn To Duck Early

Roadside Bombs Built To Look Like Street Curbing Bush Says Iraq War Affecting The "Psychology Of Americans", But Refuses To Withdraw Troops

Former CIA Terror Expert Says Bush Claim That Iraqi Insurgents Will Attack Americans In The Homeland Is "Insane"

Bush Lies, Distorts Al Qaeda Strength, Links In Iraq

Iraq : Millions Of Tons Of Munitions Have Been Lost

Oopsy.

From the Washington Post :

The U.S. military's faulty war plans and insufficient troops in Iraq left thousands and possibly millions of tons of conventional munitions unsecured or in the hands of insurgent groups after the 2003 invasion -- allowing widespread looting of weapons and explosives used to make roadside bombs that cause the bulk of U.S. casualties, according to a government report released yesterday.

Some weapons sites remained vulnerable as recently as October 2006, according to the Government Accountability Office report, which said the unguarded sites "will likely continue to support terrorist attacks throughout the region." For example, it said hundreds of tons of explosives at the Al Qa Qaa facility in Iraq that had been documented by the International Atomic Energy Agency were lost to theft and looting after April 9, 2003.

The powerful explosives missing from the Al Qa Qaa complex became a controversy on the eve of the 2004 presidential election, and the Pentagon said then that a U.S. Army demolition unit had destroyed up to 250 tons of explosives at the site.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said yesterday that securing the unexploded munitions in Iraq is "a huge, huge problem." "The entire country was one big ammo dump," he said at a Pentagon news conference. "We're doing our best to try and find them but, given the expanse of the country and all the other tasks that the military is trying to carry out there, it's a huge task," he said. Gates has said that roadside bombs cause about 70 percent of U.S. troop casualties.

Gates also acknowledged that the war in Iraq would slow the ability of the U.S. military to fight another major conflict. "We would not be able to achieve our goals on the timelines that we've set for ourselves in terms of being successful in that other conflict," he said. "It would take a little longer and we would not be as precise. We would not have as many precision weapons," he added. "It would be more of a blunt-force effort."

The GAO report pointed to several critical assumptions underlying U.S. military war plans in 2003 that proved invalid -- including expectations that Iraqi resistance was unlikely and that the Iraqi army would capitulate and continue to provide security.

As a result, widespread looting of munitions took place, including at the majority of Iraqi Republican Guard garrisons as well as 401 other sites, according to the GAO.

Pentagon programs have secured or disposed of more than 417,000 tons of munitions, the report said. But it said an unknown quantity -- ranging from thousands to millions of tons of conventional munitions -- remain unaccounted for.

BATTLE OF NAJAF REVISITED

Clearly the masters of spin have done a truly brilliant job in disguising the facts about the massacre of Najaf.

It would appear that storymakers in Iraq and the US are working in smooth, crisp conjunction to make sure that as long as the majority of people who were interested in this were paying attention, that they were fed the easy-to-swallow myths of messianic cults, political assassination conspiracies and a general slew of 'crazy Iraqis' slurs.

One of the first questions raised by mainstream media columnists and a storm of comment board 'operatives' was : If they weren't up to no good, why were so many of them walking around at night?

It immediately seeded doubt in the minds of Americans, Brits and Australians, in particular, because we don't understand that travel by night in the the Middle East (and across Africa) is a commonplace activity.

They only needed to cover up the truth for 48 hours at the most, because within two days another Iraq story would grab the headlines.

It is truly remarkable, although not surprising, just how quickly a massacre of a few hundred Iraqi women, children and men becomes just another story.

Particularly when you consider the emphasis placed by historians like Niall Ferguson on massacres of 20 or 40 civilians in villages in Europe during the early days of World War 2.

Iraq is seeing 'pogroms' claiming hundreds of lives ten or twelve times every single month.

From Chris Floyd :

It has been cast as a ferocious battle against a mighty opponent: a fanatical "apocalyptic cult" storming the holy city of Najaf with hundreds of warriors led by a self-proclaimed Islamic Messiah, their frenzy quelled only at the last moment by a massive intervention of American firepower. But as with so much else in the blood-soaked annals of the Bush Administration's disastrous Babylonian Conquest, it appears this neat story masks a far grimmer, grubbier truth: a mass slaughter of civilians, caught in the toxic fog of hair-trigger tension, sectarian hatred and violent political ambition unleashed by the U.S. invasion.

The January 28 clash in Najaf was, the New York Times proclaimed, the greatest one-day battle in Iraq since the fall of Baghdad in 2003. Some 200-400 "cultists" were killed by Iraqi troops and the American air and ground forces that came to their rescue when the apocalyptics – whose ranks included Baathists and al Qaeda terrorists – nearly overran the Iraqi government troops, according to the NYT and other Western media.

The "bizarre" and "extraordinary" attack by the obscure but massively armed "Soldiers of Heaven" Shiite splinter group was an attempt to kill the leading clerics in the sacred city, including Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the spiritual leader of millions of Iraqi Shiites, we were told. This massacre would supposedly usher in the reign of the Mahdi, the Islamic Messiah-figure which many Shiites believe is coming to redeem – and judge – the world. For hours on end, the outgunned and ill-trained Iraqi government soldiers held off the swarming zealots until American planes began bombing raids on the cult's entrenched positions in the groves outside Najaf and U.S. troops marched in to bolster the flagging locals.

It was indeed a rousing tale of carnage, courage and fearsome zeal, fit for one of Mel Gibson's cinematic bloodbaths. Yet in the days following the attack, it has became increasingly apparent that the story being presented in the Western media – based largely on accounts from Iraqi government officials and the Pentagon – has about as much historical accuracy as Gibson's ersatz epics.

To be fair, it's no wonder that Western accounts of the fighting were confused, as they relied on the "bizarre" and "extraordinary" – and wildly varying – accounts from officials of the Bush-backed Iraqi government. For example, one of the primary sources for the New York Times' story of the battle – which no Western reporters were allowed to witness – was Abdul Hussein Abtan, the deputy governor of Najaf province, and a member of one of the Iranian-backed, armed sectarian factions that George W. Bush has empowered in Baghdad, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). During a press conference aired on Al-Iraqiya television, Abted first claimed that the "foreign-funded" cult was led by a Lebanese, then later said its leader was an Iraqi. As Zayed notes, none of the journalists present questioned the contradiction.

In his latest report, Zayed details the bewildering array of versions offered up by factions connected with the Iraqi government. It was followers of controversial cleric Motqada al-Sadr who first identified the Najaf "attackers" as members of the cult. The Sadrists, buttressed by spokesmen in the Iraqi Health Ministry, which they control, also asserted that the group was planning to kidnap, not kill, Sistani, Sadr and other top Shiite clerics. It was also the Sadrists who claimed that the attackers were working with al Qaeda and Saddam loyalists, "and that they received logistical and monetary backing from Saudi Arabia." They said the sect's leader was an Iraqi named Dhiaa' Abdul Zahra Kadhim.

Meanwhile, SCIRI members, buttressed by the Najaf provincial government, which they control, said that more than 1,000 terrorists were killed in the battle, and that some 200 "brainwashed women and children" were detained and "removed to another place," presumably for deprogramming. SCIRI officials differed on the number of terrorists captured in the battle; one said 50, another said 16, yet another said "hundreds" were detained. It was SCIRI that advanced the notion that the attack aimed to kill the clerics, not capture them. Various SCIRI officials said the cult's leader was a) the aforesaid unnamed Lebanese national; b) Dhiaa’ Abdul Zahra Kadhim, as in the Sadrist account; c) a renegade Sadrist named Ahmed Kadhim Al-Gar’awi Al-Basri ; d) another renegade Sadrist named Ahmed Hassan al-Yamani; e) a self-proclaimed messiah named Ali bin Ali bin Abi Talib.

A SCIRI member of the Najaf governing council also claimed that "the leader of this group had links with the former regime elements since 1993. Some of the gunmen brought their families with them in order to make it easier to enter the city," Associated Press reports. An Iraqi army officer, sectarian affiliation unknown, added that Lebanese, Egyptians and Sudanese were taken prisoner in the battle – though none of these foreign fighters have yet been produced. And just for good measure, Najaf's SCIRI governor, As’ad Abu Gilel, said the attackers were Sunni insurgents, planning to attack Shiite pilgrims on their way to mark the festival of Ashura in Najaf.

U.S. military officials originally picked various items from this dizzying smorgasbord of spin in cobbling together their own version of the battle, although in general they hewed more closely to the SCIRI line. But that's not surprising, given the fact that this violent, extremist Shiite faction, whose death-dealing militia is deeply embedded in the Iraqi security forces, is currently in high favor with the Bush White House.

However, by mid-week, the Pentagon suddenly reversed course and came out with a whole new account, one cited by Bush himself, as the Washington Post reported. Now the battle was depicted as an exemplary pre-emptive strike by an "aggressive" and "impressive" Iraqi military, acting on good intelligence that the cult intended to storm Najaf and kill the leading clerics because they refused to recognize the claim of the cult's leader (now known as Samer Abu Kamar, by the way) to be the Mahdi.

Far from having to rescue the hapless Iraqis, American forces were simply there in a supporting role, providing "backup ground troops along with helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft support" in an attack on the cult's positions in the palm groves and farms of rural Zarqa, not far from Najaf, the Post said. Bush – that seasoned veteran of combat – had this reaction to the battle: "The Iraqis are beginning to show me something." And indeed, a spokesman for Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki – who has been publicly warned by Bush officials that he will be removed from the sovereign government of Iraq by the Americans if he doesn't help Bush's "surge" plan by cracking down on the Shiite militias that back him – pointed to the battle as proof that Maliki can deliver the goods.

Thus, in just three days time, the battle for Najaf morphed from an eruption of yet another level of sectarian strife threatening to overwhelm the tottering Iraqi government into a bravura display of the wonder-working power of Bush's "New Way Forward." Yet the only certainty that could really be gleaned from the official accounts ricocheting around the Western media was that when the smoke finally cleared from the palms and the fields, the ground was littered with scores of burnt and mangled corpses.

But the independent Iraqi sources paint an entirely different picture. Although here too there is much uncertainty – and thickets of impenetrable Shiite factionalism and secular political maneuvering – these accounts converge in a basic narrative that is far more coherent, and more grounded on actual reporting from the area, than the crazy quilt that Iraqi and American government officials, and the U.S. media, have thrown over the battle.

Based on accounts from Healing Iraq, the respected daily Azzaman (also here), on-scene reporting from Inter Press Service, and stories from other Iraqi papers and other media outlets translated by various websites, here is an outline of what seems to have happened on January 28.

In the early morning hours, a convoy of some 200 members of the al-Hatami tribe were making their way to Najaf for Ashura, the highly emotional commemoration of the martyrdom of Hussein, grandson of the Prophet Mohammed, at the hands of Caliph Yazid I in 680. This was the instigation of the centuries-long split between Shiites – minority adherents of Hussein and his father, Ali (Mohammad's cousin and son-in-law), whom Shiites believe were the Prophet's rightful heirs as leaders of the Muslim community – and Sunnis, the majority who believe that the early line of non-hereditary caliphs forged the true path of orthodox Islam.

The al-Hatamis are Shiites, but have dissented from the Shiite factions now running the Iraqi government: SCIRI, Maliki's Dawa Party, Motqada al-Sadr's party and others. Together with an allied tribe, the al-Khazalis, based near Najaf, the al-Hatamis have opposed the American occupation and the Iraqi government from the beginning, albeit peacefully so far. They also reject the spiritual leadership of both Ayatollah Sistani and his younger rival, Sadr, and any ties with Iran. They would not necessarily be the most welcome guests in the SCIRI-controlled province or in Sistani's hometown of Najaf, where tensions were already high as authorities braced for expected terrorist attacks on the multitude of pilgrims descending on the city.

Most of the men in the al-Hatami procession were armed – as most men are in Iraq, especially when traveling by night. At an Iraqi army checkpoint on the road between Diwaniya and Najaf, there was some kind of altercation. Whether by design or perhaps more likely through a misunderstanding of the sort that has left countless Iraqis dead at government and Coalition checkpoints, the Iraqi troops opened fire on the car carrying the tribe's elderly chief, Haj al-Hatemi and his wife, who were riding because they were too frail to join the others in the march. Seeing their chief cut down, the al-Hatamis retaliated with gunfire. They were driven back into the palm groves near Zarqa as Iraqi forces gave pursuit.

At this point, the al-Khazalis intervened, coming to support their tribal allies while reportedly trying to negotiate with the Iraqi forces to end the shooting. But the government forces had already called for heavy reinforcements. Within minutes, Iraqi ministers in Baghdad were claiming that Najaf was under attack by al Qaeda terrorists. Muaffaq al-Rubaii, the Iraqi National Security Adviser who is, curiously enough, paid by the Americans and not the Iraqis, said that hundreds of "foreign fighters" had been killed and that the Shiite splinter group Jund As-Sama was behind the attack, aiming to kill the clerics of Najaf.

There was indeed a cult group living in the palm groves of Zarqa. They were apparently part of the Mahdawiya, "a very small fringe Shia movement with scattered followers in major urban centres in the south," led by Sayyid Ahmed al-Hassan, who once followed Motqada al-Sadr's father (a revered Shiite cleric murdered by Saddam) but now claims to be the Al-Yemanni, a forerunner of the coming Shiite messiah, as Healing Iraq notes. This cult too opposes the occupation – as well as the Iraqi and Iranian governments, which al-Hassan considers apostates.

The movement has only a few hundred followers. And indeed, the Washington Post's latest report – relaying the Pentagon's admiration for the Iraqi Army's derring-do – now says that only some 700 cultist were encamped at Zarqa, instead of the 5,000 or more cited in earlier reports. Oddly enough, the cult's offices in Najaf had been raided by the Scorpion Brigade of the SCIRI-controlled Interior Ministry only days before the battle. As Zayed reports, "the same happened to [the cult's] offices in Basra, Amara and Karbala, days ago. Al-Hassan himself was placed under house arrest in Tannumah, Basra, by the Iraqi government some months ago."

Despite repeated attempts by the tribesmen, or at least some of them, to halt the fighting, the Iraqis quickly called in American air support and troops. American planes dropped leaflets on the grove, calling on all "terrorists" to surrender. Then the bombing began. According to tribal leaders, at least 120 Hatamis and more than 30 Khazalis were killed in the attack. They provided lists with the names and occupations of the dead. Local Iraqi hospitals reported women and children among the dead and wounded.

Meanwhile, from eyewitness accounts of reporters from Western papers who were at last allowed into the area, it is apparent that U.S. and Iraqi forces also devastated the cult's compound. One reporter for the Post saw at least 10 ambulances carting away the dead from the area. He was also shown a video of what Iraqi officials said were the cult's entrenchments and its large arsenal, including anti-aircraft guns, mortars, and rocket-propelled guns.

But although the outline of the incident is beginning to arise from the murk, much is still unclear. Did the cult launch an attack on the Iraqi forces that had driven the tribespeople into the grove, sparking a vicious firefight that required U.S. bombs and troops to put down? Or, as the Pentagon now claims, was the assault on the cult compound a carefully planned, already scheduled strike by crack Iraqi troops? Did the tribes blunder into the middle of this operation? Is that why the guards at the checkpoint were so quick on the trigger?

Many such questions still remain. However, it is now obvious that the original stories fed to the media about the attack were untrue – and that almost all of them were deliberate untruths, not just the usual "fog of war" uncertainties. Indeed, there was no uncertainty at all in the ever-shifting official claims; each variant was offered up as an undeniable assertion of fact.

It is also now apparent that the battle – however it originated, either through the escalation of a shooting incident or by the deliberate design of Iraqi and American forces – is being used by both Baghdad and Washington as a vindication of their disastrous policies. Bush gets to tout a "victory" by Iraqi forces (not against the real insurgents, true, but any port in a PR storm will do); while Maliki gets to pretend that he is even-handedly cracking down on Shiite militias – not by touching the death squads of his political supporters, which operate with impunity outside and inside the government, but with blunderbuss assaults on tiny fringe groups and recalcitrant tribes that, conveniently enough, oppose his collaboration with both the Americans and the Iranians.

The incident in Najaf will soon be forgotten, drowned out by the Administration's beating of war drums against Iran. But in its cynical deceptions and its murderous chaos, it is yet another microcosm of the overarching hell that Bush has made of Iraq